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ORIGINALISM’S OBITUARY
Calvin TerBeek *
∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Originalism is currently the de riguer theory of constitutional
interpretation in the legal academy. The law reviews are littered with
articles taking up originalism from every imaginable angle; one even asks
whether the creation of West Virginia was constitutional.1 The theory has
taken the name “new originalism”2 and its adherents are quick to point out
the putative sophistication of their theory,3 in addition to making claims
that “we are all originalists now”4 or “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”5
The leading conservative and libertarian new originalist theorists—
Randy Barnett, Michael Paulsen, John McGinnis, Michael Rappaport,
Vasan Kesevan, John Yoo, Nelson Lund, Saikrishna Prakash, Steven D.
Smith, Michael Ramsey, and Lawrence Alexander—and the progressive
and non-ideological theoretical fellow travelers—Jack Balkin, Lawrence
Solum6 and Keith Whittington—form the core of this scholarly school.
Many teach at impressive law schools (e.g., Yale, Berkeley, Georgetown,
Northwestern, Virginia) or self-consciously conservative law schools
(University of San Diego7 and George Mason8). These scholars are part of
*

University of Chicago, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science; Tulane University, J.D.
Vasan Kesevan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90
CAL. L. REV. 291 (2002) (querying, as the title gives away, whether West Virginia’s
admission to the union ran afoul of the constitution from a textualist and original public
meaning approach).
2
New originalism uses “original public meaning” as its interpretive heuristic, as opposed
to “original intent” or “original understanding.” Various, largely fungible variations
“original public meaning” abound. For example, Kesavan and Paulsen define original
public meaning as “the meaning the words and phrases of the Constitution would have
had, in context, to ordinary readers, speakers, and writers of the English language,
reading a document of this type, at the time adopted.” See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan and
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting
History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2003).
3
See, e.g., Robert Delahunty and John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV.
1081, 1083 (2015).
4
ROBERT W. BENNETT AND LAWRENCE SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1 (2011).
5
Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 636 (1999)
(“We are bound [to respect the original public meaning of the Constitution] because we
today . . . profess our commitment to a written constitution, and original meaning
interpretation follows inexorably from that commitment.”).
6
Though Solum is not ideological in the “left-right” sense, his embrace of (his version
of) originalism is deeply ideological in the Foucaltian sense. Solum’s brand of
originalism gives pride of place to judges (and law professors) as the interpretive
authority(ies) vis-à-vis the Constitution. This is a considerable amount of power. Saul
Cornell deserves the credit for pointing this out to me.
7
Bernard Siegan, one of the first legal academics of the modern era to embrace the law
and economics approach and libertarian constitutionalism (and a failed Reagan nominee
1
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the reason for originalism’s staying power as a theory of constitutional
interpretation.
Fashionable though it may be, a closer look reveals a theory in
decline. First, originalism suffers from epistemic closure.9 New
originalist scholars largely ignore the insights of historians, political
scientists, and other academic disciplines. Indeed, for a theory that
purports to take history seriously, some originalists have taken to referring
to historians’ questions and critiques as “history department law.”10 This,
however, is a rhetorical distraction from the uncomfortable fact that
history is much more complex and contextual than much originalist
scholarship would have it. As one leading Founding Era historian put it:
originalists “are raiders who know what [evidence] they are looking for,
and having found it, they care little about collateral damage to the
surrounding countryside that historians know better as context.”11
The reason for new originalism’s epistemic closure is easy to
discern: it is a political and ideological project. Though observers have
been suggesting (persuasively) for years that originalism is not much more
than an ideological stalking horse for substantively conservative and
libertarian results, the evidence is now incontrovertible: originalism is a
political project no matter what self-serving stories originalists want to tell
themselves (and others). Lip service can be (and is) paid to originalism’s
ostensible objectivity, but this is only to give it the patina of dispassionate
scholarship. Moreover, it is no coincidence—and proof that elite ideas
and rhetoric matter12—that those members of the public who identify as
originalists are politically conservative, libertarian, and moral

to the Ninth Circuit) taught at USD for 30 years. Margalit Fox, Bernard Siegan, 81,
Legal Scholar and Reagan Nominee, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/01/us/01siegan.html?_r=0. Today, Steven D. Smith,
Larry Alexander, Michael Ramsey, and Michael Rappaport teach at the law school.
8
STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 207 (2008).
9
Not coincidentally, the conservative movement does as well. Patricia Cohen, Epistemic
Closure? Those Are Fighting Words, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010 (“The phrase is being
used as shorthand by some prominent conservatives for a kind of close-mindedness in the
movement, a development they see as debasing modern conservatism’s proud intellectual
history.”)
10
Saikrishna Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMM. 529,
538 (1998). Another, perhaps rhetorically overheated, example is Nicholas J. Johnson,
Rights Versus Duties, History Department Lawyering, and the Incoherence of Justice
Steven’s Heller Dissent, 39 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1503 (2012).
11
Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.
KENT. L.R. 103, 104 (2000).
12
JAMES N. DRUCKMAN AND LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, WHO GOVERNS? PRESIDENTS,
PUBLIC OPINION, AND MANIPULATION (2015); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS AND ROBERT T.
SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON’T PANDER: POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE LOSS OF
DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS (2000); James N. Druckman et al., Candidate Strategies
to Prime Issues and Image, 66 J. POL. 1180 (2004).
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traditionalists.13 From the conservative legal elite down to originalists’
“honest Joe,” the theory is an ideological project.14
Consider constitutional theory through a wider historical lens. The
new originalism is simply the latest iteration of a constitutional theory
propounded by legal academics flowing from the theorists’ political
predilections to justify or criticize Supreme Court opinions. Just as (for
example) John Hart Ely wrote Democracy and Distrust to defend the
Warren Court,15 and just as Ronald Dworkin positioned himself as the
leading liberal public intellectual and criticized conservative judicial
decisions,16 the new originalism is, by and large, an ideological project
designed to justify the Rehnquist Court’s and Roberts Court’s
conservative judicial rulings, criticize its occasional failings, and
encourage it to climb further out on the ideological limb.17
Why does the theory’s epistemic closure and ideological nature
signal its demise? Consider the latest flailing about for new theoretical
jargon that will expel Balkin’s liberal originalism (and to a lesser extent,
Barnett’s libertarianism) from the originalist camp. Nelson Lund
expresses his unhappiness this way: “[b]ut whatever one’s reasons for
accepting Balkin’s proposal to marry originalism and living
constitutionalism, doing so leaves originalism in a condition akin to the
legal death that married women experienced under the old rules of
coverture.”18 Steven Smith wants to re-orient the entire originalist project
from “original public meaning” to “original decisions originalism.”19 That
is, Smith would ask whether “an enactor” of the equal protection clause
13

Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011).
14
Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law, supra, note 10 at 538 (asserting that originalism
“supplies the one, true interpretive method for honest Joe and for everybody else.”).
15
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Ely clerked for Chief Justice
Warren and dedicated Democracy and Distrust to him.
16
The New York Review of Books has an archive of Dworkin’s essays; it would be
challenging, if not impossible, to find an essay that did not advocate for a left-liberal
political position regarding the Court, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/contributors/ronald-dworkin-2/.
17
Steven Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of
Political Investment, 23 STUDIES AM. POL. DEV. 61, 75-82 (2009); Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORD. L.
REV. 545 (2006). I once wrote that the originalism project had some redeeming qualities,
such as refocusing the constitutional interpretation debate back on history and text.
Calvin TerBeek, The Cognitive Dissonance of the New Originalism, at *18-19, available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091005. Upon reflection, I am
not so sure I was correct. Originalism has introduced bad history into the debate and the
textualism scholarship it helped sprout has proven to be disappointing. William Michael
Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. L. REV. 983 (2006).
18
Nelson Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour, at *15, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570507.
19
Steven D. Smith, Meanings or Decisions? Getting Originalism Back on Track, Liberty
Law Blog, Dec. 2, 2014, available at http://www.libertylawsite.org/libertyforum/meanings-or-decisions-getting-originalism-back-on-track/ (arguing that the
legislature, not the courts, have lawmaking authority).
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would be surprised to learn that the clause was being invoked (say) in the
name of same-sex marriage. If so, then the justices should not strike down
the same-sex marriage bans.20
Further, now that the implications of the new originalist concepts
interpretation and construction21 are being made clear, conservative
originalists want to do away with the distinction because construction
allows clever liberal theorists to argue for progressive results on originalist
grounds.22
Conservative lawyer Joel Alicea has recognized this
conundrum and called for Barnett’s and Balkin’s excommunication from
“legal conservatism” cum originalism.23
Consider also the numerous theoretical permutations that
originalists feel the need to offer. And as I have written elsewhere:
Each [originalist] theorist seemingly has their own
preferred, and sometimes idiosyncratic, version of
originalism. As noted, there is Balkin’s liberal living
originalism or “framework originalism” (as opposed to
“skyscraper originalism” (i.e., conservative originalism)).
Conservative law professors John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport call their approach “original methods
originalism” which they prefer to “constructionist
originalism” (which is just a synonym for liberal
originalism). There is Vasan Kesavan and Michael
Paulsen’s — the latter once called his fellow law professors
“persons of violence” for their support for abortion rights
— awkwardly-termed “original, objective-public-meaning
textualism.” Solum calls his non-ideological approach
“semantic originalism.” Richard Kay insists that
originalism should turn back to its intentionalist roots.
Barnett has famously advocated for a libertarian brand of
originalism. The disillusioned Smith at one point called for
“old-time originalism.” Now, however, he wants original
20

Id.
KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999);
see also Randy Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 65
(2011).
22
See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2578318 (arguing that, “[t]he duty of
clarity casts doubt on the legality of constitutional construction as opposed to
constitutional interpretation in the course of judicial review, because constitutional
construction can occur only when the meaning of the Constitution is unclear.”)
23
Joel Alicea, Originalism and the Rule of the Dead, 23 NAT. AFFAIRS 149 (2015).
Barnett disagreed with Alicea’s recommendation. Randy Barnett, Am I “imperiling”
originalism? A reply to Joel Alicea, Volokh Conspiracy, March 30, 2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/30/am-iimperiling-originalism/.
21
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decisions originalism because of Balkin’s progressive
presence. (And this is to say nothing of the “new
textualism” which is not much more, crudely put,
than liberal academic lawyers’ rhetorical response to
Justice Scalia’s argument for textualism). But if all these
members of the originalist “family” [as posited by Solum]
can arrive at such disparate results, a paternity test is
needed. A family resemblance between Balkin’s,
Barnett’s, Solum’s and (say) Paulsen’s approach is difficult
to see.24
Originalism, then, sounds much like (to draw a loose analogy)25 a
theory in Kuhnian crisis.26 Kuhn noted that scientists (here, originalist
theorists), upon entering crisis (an unexplained(able) “anomaly”) will first
devise a number of different articulations of the theory in question. This
has happened to originalism. Then, as noted by Kuhn, if the anomaly
continues to persist, prominent members of the discipline begin to
acknowledge the existence of the anomaly and search for corrective
steps.27 Prominent originalist theorists have begun to recognize the
tension in their theory, and many are calling for a reformation. Indeed,
Balkin’s “living originalism”28 has caused originalism to enter what Kuhn
termed a “paradigm war.”29 This paradigm war is on full display in
competing amicus briefs filed in Obergefell v. Hodges, the same-sex
marriage case. Conservative and liberal originalists filed dueling amici
curiae on the “true” original public meaning of the equal protection clause
in regard to same-sex marriage with the apparent goal of simply
challenging the other’s version of originalism, rather than persuading the
justices (the two originalist justices’ votes not being in doubt).30
It does not appear likely that conservative originalism will emerge
from the paradigm war such that the field of constitutional theory will
return to a state of “normalcy” with conservative originalism ruling the
theoretical roost. Steven Teles has persuasively situated originalism

24

Calvin TerBeek, Originalism’s Obituary, Balls & Strikes, Feb. 11, 2015,
https://constitutionalpoliticsdotcom.wordpress.com/2015/02/11/originalisms-obituary/.
25
Every analogy has some play in the joints, otherwise it would be an identity.
26
THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 68-84 (1962).
27
Id. at 81-84.
28
JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and
the Living Constitution, 103 NW. L. REV. 549 (2009).
29
KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS at 84. I ask only half-jokingly: did Jack Balkin
murder originalism? A mind more suspicious than mine might think that Balkin’s goal
all along was precisely to create this Kuhnian crisis.
30
Jack Balkin, Living Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, Balkinization, Apr. 7, 2015,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/04/living-originalism-and-same-sex-marriage.html. As
Balkin points out, the conservative originalists’ rhetorical ploy is to lump Balkin with
Ronald Dworkin and Jacques Derrida.
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within the rise of the conservative legal movement.31 Ken Kersch, in a
number of papers in the American Political Development tradition, has
argued that “Declarationism”32 when combined with originalism “offer[s]
a powerful constitutional politics capable of affecting legal doctrine and
altering the tenor and content of American public policymaking and the
practice of American politics.”33 Thus, new originalism is part and parcel
of judicial politics and the larger political milieu.34 Conservative

31

Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra, note 17 at 75-82; TELES, CONSERVATIVE
LEGAL MOVEMENT at 208.
32
Ken I. Kersch, Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism: The Discursive
Development of Constitutional Conservatism in National Review, 1955-1980, 25
STUDIES AM. POL. DEVELOPMENT 86 (2011). Kersch explains Declarationism this way:
“Declarationism rests on the conviction that the Declaration of Independence is not only
an inherent component of the U.S. Constitution, but foundational. Declarationsists
understand the Declaration to be both philosophically and temporally prior to the
Constitution. For, without a prior commitment to the (purportedly Christian) proposition
that all men are created equal, there is no basis for considering consent to the Constitution
binding.” Id. at 101.
33
Ken I. Kersch, Beyond Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional
Redemption, 71 MARYLAND L. REV. 229, 282 (2011); see also Ken I. Kersch,
Constitutive Stories About the Common Law in Modern American Conservatism, in
NOMOS: AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (eds. Sanford Levinson and Joel Parker)
forthcoming.
34
Quantitatively-oriented political scientists have shown that the “Justices might speak
about following an ‘originalist’ jurisprudence, but they only appear to do so when
arguments about text and intent coincide with the ideological position that they prefer.”
Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 113, 133 (2002); accord FRANK CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF
ORIGINALISM (2008). Given that originalism is largely an ideological stalking horse this
comes as no surprise.
And a plethora of scholarship looking at the way originalism works in practice
on the Court has come to a similar conclusion. For examples, a study of the federalism
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court showed that the Court’s federalism majority—
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas—tended to give pride of
place to Anti-Federalists statements opining about the dangers of a strong national
government, while the dissenters—Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—
placed greater weight on the Federalists’ nationalistic statements. To the extent the
majority cited the Federalists, it cited those statements which were intended to quell AntiFederalists concerns about an overly powerful central government. Peter J. Smith,
Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original
Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2004); see also Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of
Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 71, 73
(2005) (study of all justices votes in criminal cases since 1953 finding that Scalia and
Thomas are among the most conservative justices in that voting area); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 429, 434 (2002) (noting that Rehnquist Court’s pro-federalism bent would
subordinate that goal when it conflicted with “substantive conservatism”); Lawrence
Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1244 (2012) (“As the survey of
recent ostensibly originalist decisions above makes plain, authentically originalist
adjudication is something like the Loch Ness Monster—much discussed, but rarely
encountered. In constitutional adjudication, nonoriginalism is where the action is”); Barry
Friedman and Scott Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998)

2015]

ORIGINALISM’S OBITUARY
originalism will only continue to be taken seriously insofar as the New
Right governing coalition remains intact. When, not if, it crumbles,
originalism will no longer have much intellectual purchase. Just as the
media write obituaries in advance for persons of note on the decline, it is
time to start writing originalism’s obituary. Before that can be done, I will
look at the two central and inextricably intertwined problems with
originalism that are leading to its decline: ideology and epistemic closure.
II. IDEOLOGY AND IMMODESTY
Examples abound of the political nature of originalism.
Conservative new originalists have skewered the Court for decisions that
they regard as liberal. McGinnis and Lund characterize Lawrence v.
Texas as “a tissue of sophistries embroidered with a bit of sophomoric
philosophizing.”35 Paulsen contends that Planned Parenthood v. Casey is
the worst constitutional decision of all time.36 New originalists’ Second
Amendment scholarship vigorously defends a strong individual rights
view.37 Gary Lawson believes that “[t]he post-New Deal administrative
state is unconstitutional.”38 Along those same lines, he also contends that
the nondelegation doctrine runs afoul of the original meaning of the
(“Time and again, judges have jettisoned history when founding intentions seemed
inconsistent with present needs and understandings.”).
Another data point in regard to the political project that is originalism: Cass
Sunstein’s and Thomas Miles’s study of voting patterns in the administrative law context
found that Justice Thomas won the “Partisan Voting Award” (though Justice Stevens was
a close second) and Justice Scalia won the “Judicial Activism Award.” Posting of
Thomas Miles and Cass R. Sunstein to The University of Chicago Law School Faculty
Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/10/thomas-miles-an.html (October
31, 2007). And Lori Ringhand’s research on the Rehnquist natural court (1994-2005)
found that that Thomas and Scalia voted for the conservative outcome in 93 and 85
percent respectively in those cases where the Court invalidated federal legislation. Lori
Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the
Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMM. 43, 48-49 (2007). By point of comparison,
the most liberal justices, Stevens and Ginsburg, voted in for a liberal outcome in 70
percent of those cases. Id. at 51-52. See also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as
a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORD. L. REV. 545 (2006).
New originalist Prakash proclaims that “perhaps originalist proponents make too
much of its ability to constrain judges” because, after all, “originalism has no answers for
bad faith, bias, and other human frailties” that affect judges. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s
Law, supra note 10 at 538. But perhaps the more accurate way to put it is that originalists
have no answer for the way judges, even those who profess to be originalists, actually
adjudicate cases.
35
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 1555, 1610 (2004).
36
Michael Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 995 (2003).
37
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the
Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996).
38
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1231 (1994).

35
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Constitution.39
Another scholar argues that the academic debate
concerning the original meaning of the Establishment Clause should be
resolved in favor of Justice Thomas’s position taken in his Newdow40
concurrence arguing that the clause is a federalism provision and does
confer not an individual right.41 There is the further contention that the
Founders desired the Fourth Amendment to prohibit searches of
residences, but nothing else.42 Barnett’s version of originalism is
concerned with reconstituting constitutional law toward a libertarian
reading of the document.43 Barnett is a libertarian.44 Richard Epstein has
maintained that the original meaning of the commerce clause is such that
“[t]he affirmative scope of the commerce power should be limited to those
matters that today are governed by the dormant commerce clause:
interstate transportation, navigation and sales, and the activities closely
incident to them. All else should be left to the states.”45 Recently, two
law professors predicted that originalism is now primed to provide a
theoretical ballast for Supreme Court opinions resurrecting strong judicial
protection for economic rights claims.46 Justice Thomas’s Obergefell
dissent contended that because the petitioners had not “been imprisoned or
physically restrained by the States for participating in same-sex
relationships” they had no cognizable due process claim.47 And it should
go without saying that Roe v. Wade is not admired.48 In short, it is hard to
39

Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 404 (2002).
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (Thomas, J., concurring).
41
Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the
Impossibility of its Incorporation, 8 U. PENN. J. CON. LAW 585, 585-587 (2006).
42
David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding
Revisited, 33 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 47, 48-49 (2005).
43
Trevor Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 851-53 (2005).
44
Randy Barnett, Libertarians and the War, Wall St. Journal, Op-ed, July 17, 2007,
available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110010344 (last
visited September 2, 2007).
45
Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1454 (1987).
46
Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
527 (2015). Colby and Smith have been perceptive observers of the originalism
movement, but thesis of their article – that new originalist theorizing is at the center of
the return of economic rights claims – is implausible.
47
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48
Robert BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, 32 (“[O]nce it is conceded that a judge may
give the due process substantive content, Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe are equally valid
examples of constitutional law.”); Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas
and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1610 (2004) (arguing that Roe epitomizes
“an unrepresentative and unaccountable group of Justices . . . fabricating the rights that
are pleasing to them.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of
All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1014 (2003) (“In Roe, one sees the constitutional
text essentially disappear entirely. Roe is judicial legislation completely cut loose from
any pretense of textual justification.”); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the
Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMM. 311, 322 (2005)
(“On abortion, is it more important to follow a bitterly contested precedent from thirty
40
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find an area of law where most originalists do not argue that a
substantively conservative outcome is dictated by the original meaning of
the Constitution. Mirabile dictu.
What also seems to escape, or is at least ignored by, new
originalists is that the theory was crafted by New Right conservative legal
elites. Teles has shown that originalism, especially in the Department of
Justice under Edwin Meese, became an intellectual banner under which
conservative legal positions consolidated.49 There was a concerted effort
to create what conservative legal elites called the “Reagan underground”
in order to undergird the burgeoning conservative legal movement.50
Indeed, McGinnis, Lund, Paulsen, and Calabresi served time in the
executive branch of a Republican president (Calabresi after he helped
found the Federalist Society and clerked for Justice Scalia).51 It is hard to
improve on Teles’ assessment of originalism in the Reagan Justice
Department:
Starting as a series of speeches, the originalism project
grew into a broader set of departmental programs, with
consequences that are still being felt today. The project was
“transformative” in the sense that it was designed to
provide a unifying language for conservative elites and to
legitimate conservative ideas within the profession and the
legal academy. While the originalism project was certainly
designed to aid the short-term objectives of the DOJ
leadership, it was equally the case that its leaders expected

years ago or is it more important to repudiate that precedent so as to tame a line of
substantive due process disasters that begins with Dred Scott and goes on to include
Lochner? Sometimes preserving continuity with our fundamental values means
displacing wayward practices and precedents that have grown up like barnacles on the
pristine language of the constitutional text.”); Raoul Berger, Activist Censures of Robert
Bork, 85 N.W. L. REV. 993, 1013 (1991) (“Roe was decided by a vote of five to four
[sic]; the vote of a swing Justice does not render the majority omniscient. And the Roe
minority was hardly alone in its views--respected scholars, too, consider that there is no
‘right of privacy’ in the Constitution.”). Of course, Roe was decided on a 7-2 vote with
Justices Rehnquist and White dissenting.
49
Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra note 17; TELES, RISE OF CONSERVATIVE
LEGAL MOVEMENT at 207.
50
Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra note 17 at 70.
51
Faculty Profiles of Stephen Calabresi, available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/profiles/StevenCalabresi/; and Michael Paulsen,
available at http://www.stthomas.edu/law/facultystaff/faculty/paulsenmichael/. What is
more, John Yoo famously served in the Bush II Administration and authored an
important memorandum on the unitary executive and torture. A Guide to the Memos on
Torture, N.Y. Times, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMOGUIDE.html. Prakash clerked for D.C. Circuit “feeder judge” Laurence Silberman and
then Justice Thomas. Ramsey clerked for Scalia as well. On the Federalist Society as an
epistemic network, see Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Ideas With Consequences: The Federalist
Society and the Conservative Counterrevolution 13-27 (2015).
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it to have longer-term impacts on the strategic environment
outside of government.52
In addition to largely being an ideological stalking horse, the new
originalism is also an immodest theory (though it came from much more
humble origins, i.e., “old originalism,” or, as Keith Whittington more
accurately describes it, “reactive originalism”).53 As the judiciary became
more conservative as a result of Presidents Ronald Reagan’s and George
H.W. Bush’s appointments to the federal bench, originalism morphed into
a theory whose academic adherents contended that the countermajoritarian
difficulty was of no moment, judicial restraint was uncalled for if the
Court was to “get it right,” and stare decisis was a loose constraint, if a
constraint at all.54 One originalist scholar has it that “[i]nterpreting the
52

Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy, supra note 17 at 70.
Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 604 (2004).
It appears that nearly every law review article on new originalism has a de facto
requirement that a section of the article must be dedicated to telling the history of old
originalism, many times in a fabular manner. This is unnecessary (here), and can be
accomplished in a few citations set forth in reverse-chronological order. Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); William
H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 (1976);
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 889 (1985); Edwin Meese III, U.S.
Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985); Edwin
Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution,
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465–66 (1986); Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
Address by Justice Antonin Scalia Before the Attorney General’s Conference on
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office
of Legal Policy, Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook, app. C at 101, 106
(1987); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989); William Brennan,
The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in Interpreting the
Constitution (Jack Rakove, ed. (1990); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICAN:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 116 (1990); Phillip Bobbit, Constitutional
Interpretation (1991); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875
(1992). I am unaware of any originalist creation story that gives credit to Justice Black.
Cf. NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 145 (2010).
54
See Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution, supra note 48 at 322; Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Case Against Precedent, 22 CONST. COMM.
289, 289 (2005); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25 (1994) (arguing that precedent is unconstitutional subject to
some qualifications); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 153739 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2706, 2733 (2003); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An
Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001) (responding to
Paulsen’s argument and arguing that stare decisis is grounded not only in the text, history,
and structure of the constitution, but also because of entrenched status as part of
53
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Constitution is no more difficult, and no different in principle, than
interpreting a late-eighteenth century recipe for fried chicken.”55 Justice
Scalia, the most prominent originalist on the bench, has called “nonoriginalists—originalists favored term for those who do not share their
views—“idiots,”56 and has backed away from his prior confession of being
a “faint-hearted” originalist.57 Prakash contends that originalism “supplies
the one, true interpretive method for honest Joe and for everybody else.”58
He goes further, arguing that non-originalist “propositions” are “absurd”
and this “is why we all are (or should be) originalists.”59 Prakash also
champions his “Default Rule” of interpretation—construe (almost) all
communications using their original, ordinary meaning60—as the
“universal” method for interpreting most texts.61 In fact, according to
Prakash, the fact of “the Constitution’s very existence as law” supports the
Default Rule.62 John Yoo argues that originalism “can help keep [the]
Union alive and well.”63 And, it is worth reiterating, new originalists
continually self-congratulate their theory as “sophisticated.”64

American constitutionalism); Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss, supra, note 43 at 859
(“Professor Barnett, however, is little concerned with countermajoritarianism.”); EARL
MALTZ, RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ORIGINALISM, INTERVENTIONISM, AND THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18-20 (1994). Maltz, in a 1990 law review article,
presciently noted that “ideological forces will probably move the Court toward a more
aggressive conservative activism in the future” and that, especially in the commerce
power area, originalism would counsel an activist role for the judiciary. Earl Maltz, The
Prospects for a Rival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA.
L. REV. 629, 631-32 (1990); see also Stephen M. Griffin, Barnett and the Constitution
We Have Lost, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283, 287-292 (2005); John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 68
(2007); Raoul Berger, New Theories of “Interpretation”: The Activist Flight From the
Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 2 (1986).
55
Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . And Constitutions, 85 GEO. L. J. 1823, 1834
(1997).
56
Associated Press, Scalia: Non-originalists Are ‘Idiots’, Feb. 14, 2006, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/02/14/scalia-non-originalists-are-idiots/.
57
Ilya Somin, Justice Scalia Repudiates “Fainthearted” Originalism, The Volokh
Conspiracy, Oct. 7, 2013, http://volokh.com/2013/10/07/justice-scalia-repudiatesfainthearted-originalism/; Randy Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “FaintHearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006); Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 53 at
864 (describing himself as a “faint-hearted” originalist).
58
Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law, supra note 10 at 529.
59
Id. at 531.
60
Id. at 529.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 541-42; see also Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme
Left-Wing Law Professors are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207, 2216, 2219
(2006) (REVIEWING CASS SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)). For an entertaining reply to Prakash, see
Cass A. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234 (2006).
63
Robert Delahunty and John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 101, 1081
(2015).
64
Id. at 103.
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New originalists, according to their lights, have constitutional
interpretation figured out. There may be some kinks to work out—
interpretation and construction, the constraint principle or thesis, the best
normative justification for originalism—but these are intramural disputes.
To invoke and paraphrase Mark Tushnet, one might view the originalist as
astrophysicist.65 He—and they are all male—has surveyed and selectively
sampled scholarship far and wide, whether it be history, philosophy, or
linguistics, and has mastered constitutional interpretation. But this
unjustified confidence is a result of originalists’ epistemic closure. I now
turn to that feature of the theory’s Kuhnian crisis.
III. ORIGINALISM’S EPISTEMIC CLOSURE
The new originalism suffers from epistemic closure. Though
happy to borrow from other disciplines, new originalists rarely grapple
with the criticisms academics trained in those disciplines set forth.
Perhaps the most prominent approach to deconstructing originalism has
been by academic historians such as Saul Cornell and Jack Rakove.
Rakove won a Pulitzer Prize for his Original Meanings, a work of
scholarship that should have given originalists significant pause.66 In
Rakove’s account of James Madison’s first exercise in into constitutional
interpretation in his early congressional days, Rakove shows that even
Madison, when it suited his purposes, rejected and then relied on the
original understanding in congressional debates over the president’s
removal power of executive officials and a proposed bank bill.67 The
upshot of course is that Madison’s reliance on what we now call original
understanding was contextual vis-à-vis his priors.68 Elbridge Gerry
criticized Madison’s argument “as ‘being made for the occasion.’”69
There is a lesson to be drawn from this:

65

As Tushnet wrote: “the ‘lawyer as astrophysicist’ assumption, namely, that the
generalist training of lawyers allows any lawyer to read a text on astrophysics over the
weekend and launch a rocket on Monday.” Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the
American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979).
66
JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1996).
67
Id. at 347-54.
68
Id. at 354. Rakove is agnostic as to Madison’s precise motivations but posits that his
opposition may have been motivated by skepticism of Hamilton, a regional dislike of the
bank as serving mostly Northern interests, or simply ideological suspicions. Id. More
charitably, Rakove also theorizes that Madison’s divergent interpretations were driven by
his philosophical distrusts of legislatures. Id. at 353-54. It is also interesting that Elbridge
Gerry, Alexander Hamilton and Edmund Randolph (the first Attorney General) all
rejected the use of notes or speeches from the Convention as a guide to constitutional
interpretation. Id. at 353-54.
69
Id. at 353.
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But if originalism could thus be defended as a neutral mode
of interpretation, the temptation to resort to it was
manifestly political. It was dictated not by prior conviction
that this was the most appropriate strategy to ascertain the
meaning of the Constitution but by considerations of
partisan advantage . . . . It merely demonstrated that the
neutrality could rarely be attained when the Constitution
was so highly politicized, or when politics was highly
constitutionalized.70
In short, the “first serious foray in originalism was a failure.”71 However,
besides one largely dismissive book review by Prakash—wherein he
largely created the “Default Rule” of interpretation and relied almost
exclusively on other new originalist scholarship for support72—new
originalists had no answer for Rakove’s critique.
Cornell has been equally if not more devastating in his critiques of
new originalism. Cornell has shown that the “original public meaning”
heuristic subscribed to by most academic originalists is historically
incoherent (there was not one public meaning) and any choice of whose
views to give pride of place (e.g., Federalist, Anti-Federalists) is
inherently an ideological choice.73 Cornell has also shown that new
originalism is law-office history (which is to say, bad history) by taking
his historical scalpel to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller v. District of
Columbia.74
Cornell has also taken to task Solum’s attempt to fashion a nonideological approach to originalism, based on linguistics and philosophy,

70

Id. at 365.
Id.
72
Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law, 15 CONST. COMM. at n. 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, and
26. As noted above, Prakash dismisses Rakove’s study as “history department law.” Id.
at 534. But it is Prakash’s “Default Rule” that is unsupported by deeply researched
scholarship. Judges in the Founding Era were not especially textualist. Treanor, Against
Textualism, supra, note 17; William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury,
58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2006). Treanor is trained as a historian. For a critique of liberal
textualism (e.g., Akhil Amar), see Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History,
11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (1999).
73
Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution v. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J. L. &
HUMANITIES 295 (2011). Indeed, one has to only skim the surface of the available
Founding Era historiography to understand that the “original public meaning” heuristic is
problematic. See, e.g., JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
INVENTION OF AMERICA (2007); GORDON WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF
THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 (2009); GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991); ALFRED E. YOUNG, LIBERTY TREE: ORDINARY PEOPLE
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2006); SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999).
74
Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss,
Same as the Old Boss”, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009).
71
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as misapprehending crucial aspects of those fields.75 Thus, despite his
best efforts, Solum has not provided a viable “non-ideological” alternative
basis on which to ground originalism. (Professor Solum almost certainly
disagrees with this assessment, but I leave it to the interested reader to
digest the dueling papers).
Neither do new originalists pay much attention to political science
if it gets in the way of their ideological project. For example, take the
originalist literature on abortion. As shown above, new originalists do not
much care for Roe. One new originalist scholar contends that in reading
Roe “one sees the constitutional text essentially disappear entirely. Roe is
judicial legislation completely cut loose from any pretense of textual
justification.”76 McGinnis and Lund argue that Roe epitomizes “an
unrepresentative and unaccountable group of Justices . . . fabricating the
rights that are pleasing to them.”77
However, we know that Roe was in large part a product of a social
movement.78 It is also misleading to contend that the justices simply
75

Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The
Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013);
Lawrence Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111
(2015); Saul Cornell, Originalism as Thin Description: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2015). What is more, a recent philosophical critique of originalism,
and especially semantic originalism, has further underscored the intellectual challenges
that face new originalism. Gregory Bassham and Ian Oakley, New Textualism: The
Potholes Ahead, 28 RATIO JURIS 1 (2015). Indeed, Solum’s theory of originalism has
been persuasively critiqued on its own terms by a law student. Ethan J. Ranis, Loose
Constraints: The Bare Minimum for Solum’s Originalism, 93 TEX. L. REV. 765 (2015).
76
Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 48 at 1014.
77
Lund & McGinnis, Judicial Hubris, supra note __ at 1610. It seems important to note,
but is rarely mentioned by originalists, that Justice Blackmun appears to have been
“egged on” by the other justices in the Roe majority to write a more expansive opinion
than he originally planned. David J. Garrow, How Roe v. Wade Was Written, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 893 (2014).
78
DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 79-130 and 270-334 (1994). The classic work in the field of
how courts can, and cannot, effectuate significant social change is GERALD ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991; 2d ed. 2008); see also Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VIRG. L. REV. 7, 10, 11, 76 (1994) (arguing,
in a perhaps overstated thesis, that Brown and the federal judiciary in general had almost
no power to effect social change when acting on its own). For more on social movements
and constitutional change see Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to
Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 28 SUFFOLK L. REV. 27, 28
(2005) (explaining how social movements change what it “constitutional common
sense”); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices and Social Movements,
154 U. PENN. L. REV. 927 (2006) (arguing that social movements contest the received
wisdom of constitutional meaning and that with the help of “broad-based social,
economic, or technological changes that unsettle conventional understandings” of
constitutional principles change the way we view the meaning of the Constitution); Reva
Siegel, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de fact
ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2006) (“Social movements change the ways
Americans understand the Constitution”). Robert Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (2003); see also
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imposed their liberal values on an unwilling populace. Prior to the Court’s
decision in Roe, a majority of the American public supported some limited
form of abortion rights79 and that right has continued to enjoy steady
support over the past thirty-plus years.80 (Though it is worth considering
if abortion rights are actually an elite policy preference that the “median
voter” happens to share).81 We also know that abortion is an issue many
legislators want the public to believe is in the courts’ hands and that elites
(especially Republican elites) are happy to have the issue
constitutionalized.82
What is more, the legal elites that make up the federal judiciary,
and the political elites from both parties that place them there, are
generally supportive of legalized abortion.83 Rather than removing
abortion from the political arena—a common originalist charge—Roe is
responsible for creating a constitutional dialogue between the Court, the
legislative branch, and the public.84 In fact, it was not until the late-1970s
that what we know as the pro-life movement became a coherent and
powerful social movement.85
More broadly, despite their alleged lack of concern with judicial
restraint, new originalists still refer to “We the People”86 “legislating from
the bench,”87 and the judiciary taking away “decisions from the political

Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 3 (2007). Carol Nackenoff argues that constitutional meaning—rather than
culled from the original public meaning—is instead a product of “[m]obilized activists,
interest groups, lawyers, legal scholars, social scientists, legislators, administrative
officials, other political figures, journalists and editors, and maybe even now bloggers”
who all “play an important role in framing—and reframing—constitutional issues.” Carol
Nackenoff, The Political Tilt of “Juristocracy”?, 65 MARYLAND L. REV. 139 (2006).
She continues, “[a] jurisprudential model that focuses so exclusively on the Court’s
interpretation of constitutional meaning incorrectly neglects the ways in which
constitutional meanings are actually and actively constructed by other actors in the
political process.” Id.
79
Friedman, Dialogue, supra note __ at 607.
80
See Calvin TerBeek Empiricizing the Equal Protection Approach, 38 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 775, 796 (2007).
81
Calvin TerBeek, Politics by Other Means, THE NEW RAMBLER, May 27, 2015,
available at http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/politics-by-other-means.
82
TerBeek, Equal Protection Approach at 796, n. 145 (collecting sources).
83
Mark GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 7 (2008).
84
Friedman, Dialogue, supra note __ at 658-67.
85
Reva Siegel & Robert Post, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash. 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
86
Steven D. Smith, Meanings or Decisions? Getting Originalism Back on Track, Liberty
Law Blog, Dec. 2, 2014, available at http://www.libertylawsite.org/libertyforum/meanings-or-decisions-getting-originalism-back-on-track/ (arguing that the
legislature, not the courts, have lawmaking authority).
87
Nelson Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour, at *2-7, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570507 (arguing against Balkin’s
form of originalism as essentially nothing more than living constitutionalism in
originalist jargon).
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process.”88 But these “old originalism” concerns are seemingly raised
only when a liberal rights claim is at issue. Simply stating “We the
People” is not much more than invoking a political slogan. The empirics
of the actual political process we have is much more complex than the
new originalists’ simplistic conception.
Consider the evidence regarding elite capture of the policymaking
process. Martin Gilens has shown in great detail that merely being affluent
–that is, being in the 90th percentile of income earners (“only” $135,000
per year)—means that the policies you support are much more likely to be
enacted.89 Moreover, in an important paper co-authored with Benjamin
Page, Gilens sets forth more evidence that elites and business interests
have an outsized impact on policy, and the majoritarian electoral voter
theory (implicit in new originalists’ invocation of the “political process”)
suffers in empirical comparison.90 Perhaps even more troubling, a pilot
study by political scientists found that the top-tenth of the one percent (in
wealth) are significantly more conservative in economic preferences than
the American populace – and they are politically active.91 Thomas Keck
has shown that courts’ decisions in contested hot-button issues (e.g., samesex marriage and affirmative action) reward both liberals’ and
conservatives’ use of the judicial process as another tool to enact their
preferred policies.92 Larry Jacobs and James Druckman’s pathbreaking
recent scholarship on how elites, especially those in the executive branch,
help shape public opinion should give any (small-d) democrat pause.93
Expanding on Robert Dahl’s work, Jacobs and Druckman argue that
American democracy is best understood as a neopolyarchy.94
This lack of familiarity with how the political process actually
works in reality is further evidence of originalism’s epistemic closure.95
88

Yoo and Delahunty, Saving Originalism, supra note 3 at 107.
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA (2012). See also KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA, AND
HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE
BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2012); LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008).
90
Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 564 (2014).
91
Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, and Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy
Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 51 (2013). The study
was limited to Greater Chicago area and has “n = 83.” Broad conclusions cannot be
drawn, but the findings are worthwhile and interesting nonetheless.
92
THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES (2014).
93
DRUCKMAN AND JACOBS, WHO GOVERNS, supra n. * (see, especially chapters 4 & 5).
94
Id. at 120-128, 134-137.
95
Consider the implications of this research for the countermajoritarian difficulty. A
number of scholars have argued that the countermajoritarian difficulty is not nearly as big
a concern as previously supposed. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L. J.
153, 156 (2002); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1993) (arguing that countermajoritarian difficulty does not have much explanatory
power); see also Mark A. Graber, Foreword: From the Countermajoriarian Difficulty to
89
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What is more, not content to ignore discrete findings, new originalists will
dismiss whole bodies of research that threaten their theory. For example,
Solum dismisses nearly a century’s worth of political science research on
judicial behavior in his book on originalism:
In the grand sweep of human history and in the light of
judicial practice across the globe, the theories advanced by
the American legal realists and their heirs are aberrational.
For most of human history and in most of the legal systems
of the developed world, the ability of judges to follow the
law has been accepted in theory and demonstrated in
practice.96
Solum marshals no support for this assertion.97 Solum’s epistemic closure
is unfortunate, but perhaps understandable. Counting conservatively,
Juristocracy and the Political of Judicial Power, 65 MARYLAND L. REV. 1, 1-4 (2006)
(detailing the conflicting research agendas of political scientists—who long ago
dismissed the countermajoritarian difficulty as inadequate as a descriptive matter—and
legal academics, a number of whom still take it seriously); Cornell W. Clayton, The
Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (or, Why be so positive about the
Judicialization of Politics?), 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 69, 76 (2002) (“If, however, the
empirical claim is true—if courts rarely deviate from the concerted and coherent policy
direction of the elected-governing coalition—then the normative debate becomes largely
academic.”). But if we have legal elites reviewing elite-preferred policy, might this
render the entire debate somewhat incoherent? This is an issue that deserves further
research.
96
ROBERT BENNETT & LARRY SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 51
(2011).
97
Moreover, the concern is whether judges follow the law in the U.S., and if originalism
is even possible in practice here. See Daniel Levin, Review of Constitutional Originalism:
A Debate, Law & Politics Book Review at 385-387. To dismiss the body of judicial
behavior research in two sentences is, at best, puzzling. That literature raises significant
issues for new originalist theory. To start, the canonical cite is to Jeffrey Segal’s and
Harold Spaeth’s The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. See JEFFREY SEGAL &
HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). But while
a judge’s “attitude” certainly has an explanatory component, ideological considerations
do not fill out the whole picture.
There are numerous exceptions to the attitudinal model in the judicial behavior
literature. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM LANDES, AND RICHARD POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL
CHOICE (2013); MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT:
LAW, POLITICS AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(2006);THOMAS G. HANDSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON
THE SUPREME COURT (2006); CORNELL CLAYTON AND HOWARD GILLMAN, SUPREME
COURT DECISIONMAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (1999); HOWARD
GILLMAN AND CORNELL CLAYTON, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (1999); LEE EPSTEIN AND JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1999); Maya Sen and Adam Glynn, Identifying Judicial
Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 37 (2015); Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party
Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, available at
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Solum has published eleven journal articles—not including the 176-page
article entitled Semantic Originalism available on SSRN—and a book on
new originalism. This is an enormous amount of time and energy to
expend on an intellectual project. Solum is deeply invested in the
continuing vitality of new originalism. This might help explain the
otherwise puzzling dismissal of judicial politics literature by a scholar as
accomplished as Solum.
Yet it does not help for originalists to be ostrich-like98 to the reality
that the theory is in the fight for its life. As a number of scholars have
noted, originalism as currently conceived (allowing for Balkin and
Barnett) does not much differ from “non-originalism.”99 This is why
conservative originalists are flailing about for a terminology that will
exclude Balkin and Barnett. Indeed, Alicea has accurately stated that
“originalism’s future” is at stake in what I have called originalism’s
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2432111 (exploring how party
polarization and social psychology help explain the current Court); see also Thomas M.
Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?
101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 337 (2007) (criticizing analysis that seeks to explain
Supreme Court decisionmaking soley through an ideological lens); Keith E. Whittington,
Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW
& SOC. INQ. 601, 606, 622 (2000) (noting the strength of the attitudinal model--“its
ability to muster quantitative evidence” in support of it--and its weaknesses: “[t]he
attitudinalist model tells us a great deal about how a given justice is likely to vote in a
case that raises particular issues, but it tells us little about how such cases arose, how
those issues had been framed, and why the justices approach their task in these ways.”);
Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal
Model” of Judicial Decisionmaking, 26 Law & Soc. Inq. 465, 494-95 (2001) (arguing
that Segal and Spaeth’s account is necessarily incomplete).
Legal scholars have been critical of the attitudinal model as well. See STEPHEN
M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 132 (1996)
(calling the empirical evidence for the attitudinal model “somewhat weak” given its
reliance on newspaper editorials written at the time of justices' nomination to classify her
as liberal or conservative); Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES POL.
261 (2006) (noting that the central point of the attitudinal model “can be vastly
overstated”)); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 280
(2005) (noting that scholars “ignore . . . at their peril” that law plays a role in judging);
Stephen Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and
External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 LAW & SOC. INQ. 89, 95 (2005)
(noting that if Segal's and Spaeth's denigration of the legal model has any explanatory
power, it is based “their cramped vision”); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic
Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 144344 (2001) (calling attitudinal model “naïve”); Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the
New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 251, 279 (1997) (identifying the shortcomings of the attitudinal model).
98
In reality, ostriches do not bury their heads in the sand as this would be a poor
evolutionary adaptation.
99
Eric Segall, Originalist Defenses of Overturning Same-Sex Marriage Bans: Really?,
Dorf on Law, Feb. 9, 2015, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/02/originalist-defenses-ofoverturning.html; Peter J. Smith, How Different are Originalsim and Non-Originalism?,
62 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (2011) (answering the question in the title: not very much). For a
cogent critique on this very point, see Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living
Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009).
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paradigm war.100 But at a certain point, coining new jargon that purports
to fix a “theoretical” hole in order save ideologically-preferred outcomes
will fail to be intellectually respectable. Given its ideological nature,
intellectual immodesty, and epistemic closure, originalism will eventually
join other theories of normative constitutional interpretation previously
discarded.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the mid-1990s, Laura Kalman wrote of the crisis of legal
liberalism.101 Legal realism sparked academic lawyers to “search[] for
criteria that would enable them to identify objectivity in judicial
decisions.”102
Kalman noted the many (now discarded) liberal
constitutional theories: the turn to Rawls, Dworkin’s body of work, Ely,
and the attempt to intertwine the Founding Era’s republicanism with legal
liberalism.103 Indeed, it was only twenty years ago that a liberal law
professor could write: “We are all republicans now.”104
That search for objectivity failed. This is because, at bottom,
constitutional law and constitutional interpretation are inextricably
intertwined with politics.105 As the New Deal coalition faded, so too did
legal liberalism. As the New Right emerged, originalism seemed to
“make sense.” Just as the New Deal coalition faded, so will the New
Right, and with it originalism, at least in any form recognizable today.
The paradigm war will soon claim originalism as a casualty. A new
theory will emerge and perhaps, at least for a while, we can “all be [
]
now.”
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